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Abstract
The events of September 11, 2001 have resulted in a
substantial change in the intent of US government
policies concerning the Canadian-US border, away from an
open border perspective toward the intent to highly
control and secure the border.
For managers on both
sides
of
the
border
tasked
with
overseeing
the
functioning of the supply chains connecting their cross
border operations, this change in border policies has led
to a rethinking of supply chain strategies.
INTRODUCTION
The theme of this conference is “Access, Boundaries and
Cooperation.”
Our project looks at the functioning of supply
chains across the Canada-US border.
Unfortunately, this has
been an area of decreasing access, thickening boundaries and,
until recently, very little meaningful cooperation. This state
of affairs represents a 180 degree shift in thinking about the
Canada-US border and the importance of its smooth functioning to
the economies of these two partners in what is still the largest
bi-lateral trade relationship in the world.
This change in
perspective, especially on the part of US policy makers, can be
viewed primarily as the result of the terrorist attacks of
September 11. 2001.
Our project examines the decision making of managers who make
the day-to-day decisions supporting this trade relationship.
There has been much work done on the macro level of broad
national policies and gross trade figures to describe the health
of the relationship between Canada and the United States in
general. This project is designed to examine the micro level of
one very specific aspect of that relationship, i.e., the
decisions made by the buyers and sellers in the links of the
supply chains that support this massive movement of goods and,
to a growing extent, services across what used to be the
“longest undefended international border in the world”.
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OVERVIEW OF THE CANADA-US RELATIONSHIP
Trade between Canada and the United States
This research project is designed to examine the functioning of
supply chains across the Canada-US border. In order to begin, a
few statistics about this trade will provide some context.
First of all, it is important to note that the trade between
Canada and the US is massive.
In 2010, $645.7 billion
(Canadian) in goods and services crossed the border. That breaks
down to about $1.8 billion each day.
The Canadian government
estimates that 1 in 7 Canadian jobs depends on the trade with
the US. On the US side, 8 million jobs depend on this trade.
The trade figures for 2010, while slightly off the all-time
highs seen in 2008, are on the rebound. There also seems to be
a decline in the dependence of Canada on trade with the US as
the percentage of total Canadian imports and exports with the US
declined from 75% in 2005 to 68% in 2009.
(all figures from
www.statcan.gc.ca).
The content of that trade is fairly stable. The US sends Canada
vehicles, machinery and electrical equipment. Excluding energy,
Canada sends the US the same. Much of that can be explained by
the fact that approximately 45% of the trade is intrafirm, i.e.,
subsidiaries of the same firms sending subcomponents back and
forth across the border.
This is very characteristic of the
supply chains linking industries across the two countries,
especially the highly integrated supply chains in the automotive
industry, located primarily in Ontario, Michigan, Ohio and New
York.
These interdependent linkages have grown substantially
since the Auto Pact went into effect in the 1960’s. The sheer
intensity of the interdependency of these supply chains can be
understood by noting that some of the components in the assembly
of an automobile can cross the border as many as seven times
before final assembly (Canadian Chamber of Commerce, 2009).
This is clearly an area where managers might feel the need to
make some changes in the design of these supply chains.
There are also examples of intrafirm trade in other industries,
such as processed foods.
From the manager’s perspective, the
degree to which the links in their supply chains are part of the
same corporate family may decrease the flexibility of their
choices and impact the nature of the choices made.
As an
example, while the Ontario apple growers may choose to find new
customers, an assembly plant in Windsor making subcomponents in
the auto industry may not be able to choose to sell those
subassemblies to a different “buyer”.
But the buyer might
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choose to impose some cost or delivery constraints.
At that
point the manager in Windsor might decide it is time to move to
Michigan or at least to build a warehouse in Michigan.
Another aspect of the trade relationship that is often mentioned
as a critical element is the fact that Canada is the largest
provider of energy to the United States.
Canada is the largest
supplier of foreign oil, electricity, natural gas and nuclear
fuel. This fact combined with the importance of the automotive
industry helps to explain the variations in the value of CanadaUS trade.
It is thought that the year-to-year changes in the
value of Canada-US trade can in large part be accounted for by
noting the weakening of the automotive sector and volatile
energy prices.
Thus the changes would not reflect the results
of strategic shifts in the design of the supply chains.
The Political Environment of Canada-US Trade
The history of the political relationship between Canada and the
United States throughout the 20th century is one of close
cooperation and integrated views of appropriate international
involvement.
As examples, Canada and the United States were
early members of the United Nations and the North Atlantic
Treaty Organization. Canada and the United States developed
NORAD in 1958 to provide for the security of North America. The
political atmosphere of trust and mutual regard for the future
set the stage for the economic integration through the Canada-US
Free Trade Agreement in 1988 and the North American Free Trade
Agreement (NAFTA) in 1994. All signals from the political arena
were that cozy economic and commercial networks were in no
danger of being outlawed.
Unfortunately, the events of September 11, 2001 marked a change
in the thinking of policy makers in the US.
Specifically as
this thinking applied to Canada, the fears of the chance of any
future attacks and the mistaken belief that the 9/11 terrorists
had come from Canada led to a very dramatic change in how the US
policy makers viewed the border and anything that crosses it.
Statements such as the much quoted one by then US Ambassador
Paul Cellucci that “Security will trump trade” seemed to sum up
the US attitude about the border. It appears that this was not
just rhetoric. Under George W. Bush, the Department of Homeland
Security was formed. The Department has undertaken a series of
measures aimed at “thickening” the border around the United
States.
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In reaction to the need to provide for better security at the
border while still facilitating cross border activity, a number
of programs were established.
The Smart Border Accord
established a series of steps designed to keep the border
working. It provided for programs such as Free and Secure Trade
(FAST) to certify truck drivers across the border and NEXUS for
trusted travelers crossing by car, truck or train. Customs-Trade
Partnership Against Terrorism (C-TPAT) would provide clearance
for goods.
These programs all came at substantial costs.
The
Atlantic Provinces Trucking Association estimates that the
trucking industry in Canada is paying $1 billion per year to
comply with these new programs.
They estimate that C-TPAT
compliance alone can cost a company as much as $300,000 (Penty,
2009).
Balanced against this are estimates from the Canadian
government that inefficiencies at the Canada-US border account
for a 1% decline in Canadian GDP or $1.6 billion in 2010.
Although border security seems to dominate the discussion about
Canada-US trade, there are other important political issues to
consider. As an example, labeling laws continue to be a problem
under the “rules of origin” requirements of NAFTA.
The result
of these rules is an onerous documentation requirement for all
those goods crossing the border. This becomes exacerbated when
one considers those automotive subcomponents that cross the
border seven times. Similarly, the US Department of Agriculture
requires country of origin labels for imported food products.
This has resulted in a decrease in the exports of Canadian
cattle and hogs to the United States. In this case, it is not
because the meat is considered “unsafe” (as it was during the
“mad cow” scare). It is because US importers do not want to do
the paperwork.
For them, it is easier to find a domestic
supplier (Armstrong, 2009).
The Socio-Economic Environment
Changes in cross border trade cannot be understood just in terms
of increased border security. The good news is that a number of
studies indicate that the changes in trade are not related to
increased border security (Burt, 2007; Goldfarb, 2007). While it
is not the intent of this project to provide an exhaustive
discussion of all aspects of the external environment of
decision makers in global supply chains, it is important to note
two aspects of the socio-economic environment that form an
important backdrop.
First of all, the United States is in a
recession.
According to a study sponsored by the Conference
Board of Canada, the decline in US household spending has
actually led to a contraction in global trade – the first in 60
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years (Atunes, 2009)! As was noted, a vast majority of Canadian
exports to the United States are in automotive, food and wood
products.
These three sectors have been very negatively
impacted by the decline in the US economy. One way this decline
has shown up in consumption figures is a precipitous drop in
household spending.
As residents in the United States are
cutting back, they are buying less expensive food, not buying
new cars and not building new houses.
Taking the drop in
housing starts as an example, this has led to a drop in the
demand of wood and wood products. Canada is a major supplier of
these products when housing is being built.
So, they suffer
substantially when houses are not being built.
As a matter of
fact, the Conference Board predicted that the declines in
domestic demand coupled with the decrease in exports would lead
to a 1.7% decrease in real GDP in 2009.
The second point to make concerns the strength of the Canadian
dollar.
The Canadian dollar has strengthened against the US
dollar over the early part of the 21st century. Some preliminary
economic research has indicated that these changes have not had
a negative impact on cross border trade (Sundell & Shane, 2006).
However, managers often cite exchange rates as a major factor in
their decisions concerning supply chain partners (Gessner &
Snodgrass, 2005).
Consequently, the impact of the changes in
the exchange rate should be kept in mind as behaviors of supply
chain managers are studied.
The “Reality” of the Border
Both the recession and the exchange rate are outside the control
of individual managers and for most managers consideration of
them is not part of their daily reality.
What is real is the
border.
Anyone who lives within a few miles of any of the
important border crossings between Canada and the United States
is very familiar with the headlines and stories about what is
happening at the border.
“Border Crossings Slide” declares
Buffalo Business First in an article decrying the decline in US
customers at Niagara Falls, Ontario hotels, casinos and theater
(Fink, 2009). “New Rules Crimp Canada Ties” laments The Buffalo
News in an article on the impact of the new border rules that
have led to a drop in trips across the Peace Bridge –
conceivably for the first time in its 82 year history (Fairbanks
& Hayden, 2009).
The article does go on to say that the
recession and lousy weather may also have had an impact.
“Border laws taking toll on business, groups say” reports on the
joint efforts of the Canadian and American Chambers of Commerce
to influence US policy makers (Zremski, 2009).
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But it is not just the owners of bed & breakfasts, restaurants
and tourist attractions who are seeing the negative impact of
border security.
Supply chain managers are also feeling the
impact.
As mentioned before, the costs of compliance with the
border management programs such as FAST and C-TPAT are
significant. It is also necessary for shippers to be members of
programs on both sides of the border.
These requirements plus
the costs of border delays can cost a company as much as $1
million per year.
The costs of the border are also combined
with the paperwork burden that comes from such requirements as
the “rules of origin” under NAFTA.
Some transportation
companies such as Purolator Corporation publish white papers to
try and help customers prepare for the challenges of dealing
with the Canada-US border. Other transportation companies have
added accessorial charges to cover the additional costs of
crossing the border.
A study by the Canadian and American
Chambers of Commerce (2009) cites the example of automotive
industry and its integrated supply chains in North America. They
compare the paperwork burden for a shipment of 4,000 fully
assembled foreign cars into the United States.
That shipment
would require one customs clearance form.
A shipment of 4,000
vehicles that are assembled in Canada and the United States –
therefore crossing the Canada-US border as many as seven times
until final assembly – would require as many as 28,000 customs
and security clearance forms. And the cost burden of that does
not even count the costs of border delays!
The point is that the core of the relationship between Canada
and the United States seems to be defined in terms of the
border. Changes in that relationship are manifest in changes in
border policy.
Changes in cross border business result from
these changes in border policy. These changes are critical for
Canadian managers.
As an example, in 2005 as much as 38% of
Canadian GDP was exports and 34% of GDP was imports. Canada is
an exporting nation and exports mean there is a border.
But
historically the United States is not really a trading nation.
So, the decision variables of US managers in cross border supply
chains are not necessarily the same as those of their Canadian
partners. The next part of this paper will explore the US side
of the supply chains.
US PURCHASING MANAGERS AND THEIR CANADIAN SUPPLIERS
In the supply chains that cross the Canada-US border, many of
the decisions about managing the relationships are made by the
US Purchasing Managers who represent the large customers
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assembling subcomponents from their Canadian suppliers. One of
the issues for Canadian suppliers in their relationship with
their US customers is the fear that increased border security
would negatively impact their “attractiveness” as suppliers
because the costs of compliance with border security programs
are so high and the delays at the border would lead to
volatility in their delivery schedules. Macro level research on
variations of trade volumes as a function of increased border
security indicates there has not been a negative impact on trade
between Canada and the United States (Burt, 2007).
Another study examined the question of whether or not the impact
of heightened border security has just not shown up yet
(Goldfarb, 2007). This study also indicated that there had not
been a decrease in Canada-US trade related to increased border
security. However, the report also indicated that the Canadian
firms in the study had seen increased costs related to the need
to comply with new border security programs and they had assumed
those costs internally. Thus the US customers had not seen an
increase in their costs of supplying out of Canada and were
therefore not motivated to change suppliers.
However, the
Canadian suppliers were realizing lower profit margins.
Our study examined the decision making of US Purchasing Managers
regarding their Canadian suppliers (Gessner & Snodgrass, 2005).
Their responses indicate that exchange rates were their most
important factor in deciding to use Canadian suppliers (45% of
respondents).
Clearly costs are paramount on their minds.
Their second reason is the opportunity to develop new business
(34% of respondents).
These US Purchasing Managers view their
supply chain partners as assets to be used for their long term
viability. Traffic problems (11%) and security issues (3%) were
not viewed as problems for the US managers.
The US Purchasing Managers were also asked about their perceived
impact of increased border security.
Only 24% reported a
noticeable impact and 3% a great impact on their cross border
business.
They were also asked about the cost impact of
increased border security.
Their responses show that 53%
thought the impact was less than 1% or none while another 18% of
the respondents didn’t know. When asked about specific problems
related to the border, 59% of the respondents cited longer wait
times as the number one problem. When asked what they planned to
do to solve any problems related to the functioning of their
cross border supply chains, 35% of the respondents indicated
they would seek a domestic supplier.
The triggers for their
decisions indicate that 59% of the respondents were concerned
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that longer waiting times at the border would lead to difficulty
in maintaining Just-In-Time schedules and would increase
inventory costs.
The conclusions to be drawn from these studies for Canadian
Managers are not discouraging but they do indicate the need for
some strategic rethinking.
Clearly, there has not been an
immediate change in the supply chains across the Canada-US
border related to the increased border security requirements.
Trade between the two countries is still robust. Changes in the
volume of trade seem to be related more to the wider economic
forces related to the recession in the United States and the
wider impact of that economic decline. Further, it is the case
that much of the trade across the border is intrafirm trade
supported by supply chains that are not expected to change
quickly.
However, there are concerns that even those supply
chains may hit a “tipping point” at which changes would be made.
Further, it seems that one of the reasons that US Purchasing
Managers have not made changes is because their Canadian
suppliers are bearing the costs of compliance with border
security programs.
It would appear from this research that US Purchasing Managers
are concerned about timely delivery as well as total delivered
cost.
Both of those variables are subject to negative impact
from border issues in terms of both border delays and costly
compliance. If those two variables become problems, it is clear
that US Purchasing Managers will seek domestic suppliers.
It
also can be deduced from these studies that US Purchasing
Managers believe it is the task of the Canadian Suppliers to
make this work.
The implications for Canadian firms are that they need to begin
to develop strategies to secure their place in their supply
chains.
This might include actions designed to integrate them
further into North American supply chains. Or it might require a
rethinking.
CANADIAN SUPPLIERS AND THEIR US CUSTOMERS
In order to examine the reactions of Canadian managers, we
undertook a small study to ask about their relationships with
their US customers.
The size of the data base does not allow
for rigorous statistical testing. However, there are some
interesting findings that are worth mentioning.
First of all,
the responses confirm the importance of total delivered costs to
their success.
All of the respondents indicated that total
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delivered costs were either critical (70%) or very important
(30%) to their ability to maintain their customers.
Timely
deliveries across the border did not seem as important.
The second interesting result is that there does not seem to be
much movement in the geographic makeup of these firms’ supply
chains. By and large, they are located and competing in Canada
and the United States. There was very little indication that
even Mexico was figuring into their decision making.
The
respondents do, however, find the threat of low cost competition
to be either critical (9%) or very important (64%) to their
ability to compete globally.
The third interesting result is the fact that the respondents
found Canadian government regulations – either the multiple
jurisdictions within Canada or the differences between Canada
and other countries – to be critical (45% and 36%) or very
important (19% and 27% respectively).
It may be speculated that some of these results are a function
of the fact that the respondents are firms dealing directly at
the Canada-US border and they have a constrained market reach.
Nonetheless, they provide some direction for future research.
DIRECTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH
During the development of the background research for this
project, a number of key events occurred. On February 4, 2011
Barack Obama and Stephen Harper issued a joint declaration on a
“Shared
Vision
for
Perimeter
Security
and
Economic
Competitiveness.”
The declaration affirmed the importance of
trade to the Canadian and US economies and recognized the need
to find ways to make the border work.
On December 7, 2011,
these same two gentlemen announced the agreement on two action
plans:
The Action Plan on Perimeter Security and Economic
Competitiveness and the Action Plan on Regulatory Cooperation.
The first Action Plan addresses key problems at the border and
aims to facilitate legitimate border crossings while also
increasing security. The first key element of this action plan
designed to alleviate problems at the border are new screening
procedures for international shipments at the first port of
entry under the “Cleared once, accepted twice” concept.
This
would eliminate the present requirement to rescreen shipments.
The second feature calls for expanded membership in such trusted
traveler and trader programs as NEXUS and FAST. The third calls
for infrastructure improvements to help make these programs work
– such as expanded number of NEXUS lanes. Action plans such as
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those proposed should take much of the burden off of the actual
Canada-US border crossing and move the border out to the
perimeter of North America.
CONCLUSION
Our study was undertaken to examine the decision making of US
and Canadian managers concerning their global supply chains in
the face of increased security at the Canada-US border.
The
results from the US managers indicate that they are shifting the
burdens of security compliance to their Canadian suppliers. The
problem for the Canadian Suppliers is that there is no clear
answer as to the best course of action they can take to maintain
their positions in their existing supply chains or the ones they
want to develop. So while policy makers on both sides of the
border work out the details of border management routines
designed to facilitate trade, Canadian Managers are going ahead
with whatever they have to do to stay in business. Two articles
from the Buffalo News tell of a logistics firm from Toronto
opening a facility in Wheatfield, near Buffalo, New York and of
another machine tool company moving its factory from Cambridge,
Ontario to Wheatfield (Glynn, 2010; Prohaska, 2009).
It is
these operational level decisions by the managers in the
trenches of global supply chain management that will provide the
best information on the shape these supply chains will take in
the future.
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